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Stock prices under pressure:
How tax and interest rates drive returns
at the turn of the tax year
Abstract
We show that the level of interest rates determines the magnitude of mispricing at
the turn of the tax year, as investors face the trade-o¤ between selling a temporarily-
depressed stock this year and selling next year, but delaying tax implications by
one year. Interest rates do explain the predictable variation in US returns and selling
behavior around the turn of the year. Similar results in the UK provide out-of-sample
conrmation, as tax and calendar years di¤er. Moreover, part of the variation in the
risks and abnormal returns of size, value, and momentum factors can be linked to
tax-motivated trading.
Key words: tax-loss harvesting, January e¤ect, downward-sloping demand curves
JEL classication: G11, G12
Previous research has argued that a tax-motivated seller should sell losers early
and hold on to winners under the assumption that tax-selling behavior does not
create distortions in market prices (Constantinides (1983, 1984)). However, recent
research has argued that such tax-selling behavior at the turn of the year does generate
seasonality in the cross-section of stock returns, whose magnitude depends on the
level of the capital gains tax rate (in particular, Poterba and Weisbenner (2001)
and Grinblatt and Moskowitz (2004)). We build on these results and show that
(because interest rates determine the present value of the tax gain/loss) the impact
of tax-motivated selling also depends on the level of interest rates. In the presence
of downward sloping demand curves for stocks and limits to arbitrage, both interest
rates and capital gains tax rates drive the extent to which past losers trade at a
temporary low price at the end of the year.
Our framework suggests that the magnitude of the January rebound return be-
cause of tax-loss selling at the end of the year should vary both in the cross-section
and in the time-series. The cross-section of average January returns should vary with
a stocks capital gains overhang, dened as the ratio of the cumulative gain since the
stocks purchase to its current price.2 For a given level of capital gains overhang,
time-series variation in the January rebound return should depend on macroeco-
nomic variables: the capital gains tax rate (which determines the magnitude of the
tax payment or credit) and the interest rate (which drives the personal benet/cost of
delaying that tax payment/credit). In particular, we link the interest-rate component
of this time-series variation to the one-year interest rate since the decision to delay
the sale of the stock from the last trading day of December to the rst trading day
of January results in the delay of any tax benet/cost by one year. Rather than le
and receive the tax credit in early January, the investor must wait a year to capture
the tax savings.
In summary, while previous literature has shown that variation in capital gains
tax rates appears to forecast variation in the degree of selling pressure for loser stocks,
we argue that variation in interest rates is at least as important.3 We rst provide
an exact formulation for the way these two rates drive the stock return seasonal
2The terminology capital gains overhang is standard in this literature (see for example Grinblatt
and Han (2005)).
3In our formulation, the tax-selling premium is the amount of January rebound return for a unit
spread in capital gains overhang and is a function of interest rates and tax rates. Variation in this
premium is primarily due to interest rates. If one were to x interest rates at their average level
over the sample, only allowing tax rates to vary, the resulting variation in the tax-selling premium
is roughly one-third of the variation in the premium we document.
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caused by tax-motivated selling. We then show that this formulation does a good
job describing relevant aspects of the data.
The following example claries the intuition behind our idea. Suppose a taxable
investor in the 30% tax bracket bought a stock at $100 several years ago. The stock
has declined in value since this purchase and is currently trading at $4. Selling the
stock at $4 on the last trading day of December would generate a capital loss of $96
and o¤er a tax deduction of $28.80 (30%*$96). Thus, proceeds total $32.80: $28.80
from the tax deduction and $4 from the stock sale.
Alternatively, the investor could wait to sell the stock on the rst trading day in
January. The decision to wait provides January sales proceeds of $4 (ignoring the
small discounting across the turn of the year), but now the tax benet will not occur
until one year later and thus must be discounted by the one-year rate relevant to
this investor, here assumed to be 5%. The total present value of the proceeds from
waiting until January now equals $31.43: $4 due to the sale and $27.43 due to the
present value of the tax benet (30%*$96/1.05). Waiting to sell the stock on the rst
trading day in January results in a loss of $1.37 in present value due to the deferral
of the tax savings by one year. This analysis makes it clear that the investor would
be willing to sell the stock below the $4 fair value in December, but only to a certain
limit.
Assuming that the beginning-of-January price remains at the fair value of $4, what
December price, P , would make the investor indi¤erent between selling in December
versus January? To be indi¤erent, the proceeds of the sale at the end of the year,
P -30%*(P -$100), must equal the present value of the proceeds from selling the stock
at the beginning of next year $4-30%*($4-$100)/1.05. By equating these two values,
one nds that the stock can sell as low as $2.04 implying a $1.96 discount relative to
its fair value. This lower bound limits the extent to which price pressure can drive the
stock price down in December and thus limits the magnitude of the January rebound.
This lower bound depends on interest rates and capital gains tax rates in addition
to the level of the capital loss. Below $2.04, the investor delays selling the stock, at
$2.04 the investor is indi¤erent, and anywhere above $2.04 the investor is better o¤
selling now rather than waiting. In Section 1 we derive an explicit formula based on
this example. The formula shows a stocks January rebound return depends on that
stocks December capital gains overhang as well as interest and tax rates.
The example above highlights the importance of interest rates in the decision
process. Suppose that the interest rate in the previous example were zero. Since
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there would be no benet for accelerating the tax benet to occur this year rather
than the next, the solution for P is clearly $4. More generally, at very low interest
rates, a rational tax-motivated seller tolerates very little mispricing.
We take these predictions to the data. We create a proxy for a stocks capital gains
overhang following the methodology of Grinblatt and Han (2005). Specically, we
use past volume to weight past prices in order to create a proxy for a stocks tax basis
and therefore the capital gains overhang of the marginal seller of the stock. Just as
the example above suggests, we show that the ability of this variable to describe cross-
sectional variation in average returns at the turn of the year is a function of interest
rates and tax rates, which we dub the tax-selling premium. This predictability is
robust to including controls for various rm characteristics (size, book-to-market,
trading volume, and past return patterns) in our regression analysis.
We carefully explore the nature of this documented cross-sectional and time-series
variation in expected returns to show that it is consistent with our economic expla-
nation. We nd that the majority of the e¤ect occurs in the days surrounding the
turn of the year, but this e¤ect is also present on a smaller scale during the entire
month of December and even earlier. Though we primarily analyze U.S. data, we also
nd similar time-series and cross-sectional variation in expected returns in U.K. data
during the turn of that countrys tax year.4 As the U.K. tax year ends in April, we
argue that these international results provide strong evidence that our U.S. ndings
are consistent with a tax-selling explanation.5
Moreover, we document that this phenomenon shows up in the trading volume of
individual investors. We examine the trading behavior of individual investors using
two di¤erent methods. First, using the TAQ database, we nd that stocks with low
capital gains overhang have more selling pressure at the turn of the year than stocks
with high capital gains overhang and that this imbalance varies as a function of our
tax-selling premium. Our second method directly measures investorspropensity to
sell using the actual trades from the large discount brokerage studied in Odean (1998).
We show that not only are investors more likely to harvest capital losses before the
turn of the year but also this tendency to accelerate the realization of capital losses
is much stronger in the years where interest rates and tax rates are high.
4Reinganum and Shapiro (1987) show that after the introduction of capital gains taxes in the
U.K., the di¤erence in April returns between winners and losers becomes signicantly greater than
zero, consistent with a tax-loss selling story. Our empirical contribution is to show that this premium
varies with the interest rate as predicted by our formulation.
5We thank the editor, Cam Harvey, for this suggestion.
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Since these rm-level ndings make us condent that the tax-based pricing model
is a useful description of average returns at the turn of the year, we then examine the
way that tax-based cross-sectional and time-series variation in expected returns a¤ects
standard monthly performance attribution regressions. We rst show that tax-loss
selling e¤ects are also present at the aggregate level. Specically, we document that
the return on the market portfolio in January has a similar predictable component
that is a function of interest rates, tax rates, and the markets capital gains overhang.
Since this is the case, one might expect that measures of risk can be driven by cross-
sectional variation in the covariance of rm-level and market capital gains overhang.
We conrm that our tax-selling variables drive the alpha and market beta of a long-
short overhang portfolio. Moreover, similar predictable patterns can be found in
the Fama-French (1993) and Carhart (1997) factors. These ndings have important
implications for researchers examining economic stories describing time-variation in
the risks and returns of these factors.6
In short, our empirical results are consistent with the view that tax-motivated
selling in the presence of downward-sloping demand curves results in stock return
seasonality (a turn-of-the-tax-year e¤ect) where the extent of the resulting price pres-
sure depends on the level of interest rates and capital gains tax rates. Consequently,
our results have a practical implication for those trying to exploit the January e¤ect,
as we show that the magnitude of the anomaly should and does vary over time. In
years when capital gains overhang is limited, capital gains tax rates are low, and
interest rates are also low, one should not expect a large January e¤ect.
This time variation has a related implication. Note that some market commenta-
tors have argued that savvy investors must have eliminated the January e¤ect since
recent returns to strategies exploiting that phenomenon have been low. However,
as interest rates have also been quite low in recent data, we provide an alternative
explanation for this recent poor performance. In fact, we show that the time-series
variation in the tax-selling premium that we document is not subsumed by the inclu-
sion of a time trend.
Nevertheless, as is the case with other nancial anomalies, it is always di¢ cult
to explain the reason this ine¢ ciency has not been arbitraged away. We suggest a
few explanations for the limits to arbitrage in this case. First, unlike the value and
6For example, Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) and Cooper, Gutierrez, and Hameed (2004) fore-
cast returns on momentum strategies with variables that are clearly related to the variables our
tax-based approach suggests.
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momentum anomalies, the return pattern discussed here cannot be exploited on a
regular basis but at most only once a year during the turn of the tax year. Hence,
arbitrageurs may be reluctant to allocate a signicant fraction of their risk capital
to exploit this return pattern. Second, most arbitrageurs may not be aware of the
time variation in the protability of the January e¤ect that our analysis documents.
Finally, these e¤ects should be stronger in stocks where there are many taxable in-
vestors. Presumably, the market for these stocks may be less e¢ cient.
One can also question the reasons investors do not trade earlier in the year to
try to avoid the clumping that appears to occur. We argue that investors may
naturally display inattention to this decision because it is costly to observe and process
information.7 This argument is consistent with a growing recent literature that has
used investor inattention to understand patterns in nancial markets. Reis (2006)
develops a model of optimal inattention for a consumer who faces a cost of observing
additive income, such as labor income. Gabaix and Laibson (2002) model the cost of
observing the stock market as a utility cost. Huang and Liu (2007) apply the concept
of rational inattention to study the optimal portfolio decision of an investor who can
obtain costly noisy signals about a state variable governing the expected growth rate
of stock prices. Abel, Eberly, and Panageas (2007) study optimal inattention to the
stock market in the context of Mertons (1971) model and the presence of information
and transaction costs. Though modeling the dynamic nature of the problem we study
is beyond the scope of this paper, these papers suggest that inattention might play
an important role in such an analysis.8 Anecdotally many investors do seem to make
portfolio decisions infrequently.9 Moreover, our empirical results are consistent with
the clumping of tax-motivated trades occurring and generating price impact.
Finally, our work also relates to a growing empirical literature documenting price
pressure in asset markets, a phenomenon initially suggested by Scholes (1972). Mitchell,
Pulvino, and Sta¤ord (2004) document price pressure subsequent to merger announce-
ments and show that the trades of hedge funds appear to move prices away from fun-
7Stokey (2009) presents an extensive analysis of the issues related to inaction and infrequent
adjustment that occur in stochastic control models with xed costs.
8Intuitively, one is adding additional costs (the cost of observing and processing information, i.e.
paying attention) and benets (avoiding the clumping of trades near the turn of the tax year) to the
dynamic problem studied in Constantinides (1984). It seems plausible that reasonable calibrations
of the more complicated version of Constantinides exist where investors are reluctant to incur both
transaction and attention costs until the end of the tax year draws near.
9Both Ameriks and Zeldes (2004) and Mitchell, Mottola, Utkus and Yamaguchi (2006) provide
striking evidence that investorsportfolio adjustments are far from frequent.
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damentals. Coval and Sta¤ord (2007) document that extreme mutual fund ows re-
sult in forced trading that temporarily moves prices away from fundamental values.10
These price pressure ndings are not restricted to equity markets; Ellul, Jotikasthira,
and Lundblad (2010) and Mitchell, Pedersen, and Pulvino (2007) document price
pressure in the bond and convertible bond markets respectively. In fact, the 2010
American Finance Association presidential address of Darrell Du¢ e (Du¢ e (2010))
uses the aforementioned assumption of investor inattention to model exactly these
types of price pressure e¤ects.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 1 briey summarizes the most relevant
recent literature and shows why both tax and interest rates should explain seasonal
patterns in returns. Section 2 describes the data and the construction of our main
variables. Section 3 analyzes the empirical implications for the cross-section and time-
series of U.S. and U.K. stock returns, U.S. trading volume, and actual individual
investor trading behavior, as well as the implications for performance attribution.
Section 4 provides the conclusions.
1 The setting
A large previous literature has examined the turn-of-the-year e¤ect in stock returns re-
sulting from tax-motivated selling.11 Recent empirical work by Klein (2001a, 2001b),
10Recent papers have explored some implications of the results of Coval and Sta¤ord (2007). Lou
(2009) shows that ow-driven demand shocks more generally a¤ect prices than just in the extreme
re-sale situations of Coval and Sta¤ord. Anton and Polk (2010) show that stocks that are relatively
more connected by common institutional ownership covary more together, generating a cross-reversal
e¤ect.
11The tax-selling hypothesis has been directly considered as an explanation for stock return sea-
sonality by Wachtel (1942), Roze¤ and Kinney (1976), Branch (1977), Dyl (1977), Roll (1983),
Reinganum (1983), Chan (1986), Schultz (1985), Jones, Pearce and Wilson (1987), Reinganum and
Shapiro (1987), Sims (1995), Reese (1998), Poterba andWeisbenner (2001), Grinblatt and Moskowitz
(2004), and Ivkovi´c, Poterba and Weisbenner (2004).
Dammon, Dunn and Spatt (1989) study the valuation of tax options when short and long term
capital gains tax rates di¤er. Bossaerts and Dammon (1994) study the option value to time the
realization of capital gains and losses and Dammon and Spatt (1996) consider transaction costs and
long and short term capital gains tax rates. Dammon, Spatt and Zhang (2001) build a dynamic
consumption and portfolio decision model in the presence of capital gains taxes and short-sale re-
strictions. Dammon, Spatt and Zhang (2004) examine optimal asset allocation and location between
taxable and tax-deferred accounts.
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Grinblatt and Han (2005), Frazzini (2006), and Jin (2006) has more carefully exam-
ined this e¤ect by studying the direct empirical links between a proxy for a stocks
tax basis and patterns in returns. All of these papers relate measures of capital gains
or losses to subsequent stock returns. Like these papers, our work exploits cross-
sectional variation in a proxy for capital gains overhang; however, we also model
and test a specic prediction about the magnitude of the e¤ect for a given level of
overhang.
A few researchers have also exploited time-series variation when testing the gen-
eral predictions of a tax-based explanation for the turn-of-the-year e¤ect. Most
prominently, Poterba and Weisbenner (2001) study the way variation in the turn-of-
the-year e¤ect can be linked to changes in capital gains tax rates/regimes. Grinblatt
and Moskowitz (2004) investigate the extent to which tax-loss selling drives the prof-
its on technical trading strategies based on past return patterns. They nd that
trading prots are only statistically signicant during high tax regimes.12 The key
contributions of our paper are to argue that interesting variation should also come
from the interest rate channel and to provide empirical evidence that this channel is
important.
Thus, the objective of this section is to build a measure that relates the maximum
price distortion in December (or the turn-of-the-year e¤ect) to all the relevant factors
in a simple setting: the marginal sellers personal tax rate, the personal interest rate,
and the capital gain/loss. We take the point of view of a marginal tax-motivated
seller at the end of December.13 The seller is a rational investor, implying that his
expectations of the price in January are unbiased. This investor evaluates the benet
of selling his holdings at the end of December (time t) at a distorted price in order
to receive the tax benet associated with realizing capital losses one year earlier (the
current tax year instead of the following one).
For the sake of simplicity, assume the investor can sell stock i in January (time
t + 1) at the true value of Pi;t+1 with no uncertainty. Under the assumption of
downward sloping demand curves, tax-motivated selling will result in price pressure
in December. Consequently, the investor must determine the lowest price at which he
would be willing to sell the stock in December. To be clear, the investor solves for the
12A recent paper by Sialm (2007) studies dividend taxes and stock returns more generally to show
that before-tax returns are higher for those stocks that have higher e¤ective tax rates.
13The arguments in this section are made for a loser stock; however, a similar rationale applies to
winner stocks as well.
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December price Pi;t that makes him indi¤erent between selling in either December
or January and takes all other inputs as given. The reference price, RPi, the price
originally paid for the stock, determines the investors cost basis for the purpose of
taxation. The two other important parameters of this tax-loss harvesting decision
are the capital gains tax rate,  t, and the one-year discount factor, Bt = 11+rt , that
accounts for the time-value of money as well as the creditworthiness of the investor
through an interest rate, rt.14 This discount factor takes into account the present
value cost of the tax consequences of selling in January rather than December.
We emphasize that a one-year discount factor is appropriate despite the fact that
there is only a one-day di¤erence between trading days in our framework.15 The
reason for using a one-year discount factor is that delaying the sale by one day has
the impact of delaying the tax benet by one year. Therefore in our framework, the
magnitude of the January rebound in stock returns depends on the one-year time
value of the tax benet. Note that for simplicity, we do not have a subscript i on 
or r since we are assuming the same tax and interest rate for all stocks at time t.
We equate the after tax proceeds of the sale in December and January:
[Proceeds in December] = [Proceeds in January]
Pi;t    t(Pi;t  RPi) = Pi;t+1    t(Pi;t+1  RPi)Bt: (1)
This equation can be rearranged into
  t(Pi;t  RPi)(1 Bt) = (Pi;t+1   Pi;t) (1 Bt t) : (2)
The equation above highlights the condition that makes the marginal seller indi¤erent.
The equation says that the present-value loss of delaying the tax-credit must be
compensated by the after-tax January rebound. For the sake of concreteness, we
return to the example given in the introduction. At the temporarily low price of
14There are several complications of the tax code that are not considered in our analysis. For
example, there is a cap on the size of the capital loss deduction one can make against personal
income in any one year. Also, typically short-term capital gains are taxed at a higher rate than
long-term capital gains. Moreover, the ability to implement a short-the-box strategy has changed
over the time period we study. Finally, there are of course portfolio aspects of the decision. We
ignore these complications for the sake of simplicity.
15Note that we ignore the one-trading-day discount e¤ect on the sale proceeds for the sake of
simplicity.
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$2.04, the investor can generate tax savings this year equal to -30%*($2.04-100) =
$29.39 by harvesting the capital loss now. At an interest rate of 5%, delaying the
harvest of this tax loss by one day results in a present value loss of $29.39*(1 - 1/1.05)
= $1.40, as the investor must wait one year to receive the tax credit. This dollar
amount is the value of the left-hand side of equation (2). However, this delay allows
the investor to capture the January price rebound of ($4-$2.04) = $1.96 which results
in an after-tax gain of $1.96*(1-30%/$1.05) = $1.40, as the tax on the realized capital
gain is paid in one-years time.
Dividing by Pt and rearranging gives the stocks January rebound in units of
return as
Pi;t+1   Pi;t
Pi;t
=   t (1 Bt)
(1 Bt t)
Pi;t  RPi
Pi;t
.
This equation shows that the stocks January rebound (the return from December
to January) is a function of the capital gains tax rate, the level of the interest rate,
and the capital gains overhang of the stock, gi;t =
Pi;t RPi
Pi;t
. We further dene t 
 t

1 Bt
1 Bt t

in order to write the stocks tax-selling rebound in January as
January rebound =  tgi;t (3)
We dub t the tax-selling premium. Under our assumptions, this equation applies
for all stocks. The capital gains overhang, gi;t, is di¤erent for every stock, driving the
cross-sectional variation in the e¤ect, but the tax-selling premium, t, is the same
for all stocks, driving the time-series variation in the e¤ect. Our description has
focused on the case where the marginal investor in the stock has a negative capital
gains overhang, and thus a positive January rebound return. Nevertheless, a similar
rationale applies to stocks where the marginal investor has a positive capital gains
overhang. A tax-motivated investor sells a winner stock this year rather than next
year only if Pi;t is so (temporarily) high that it compensates the investor for the
present value loss of paying taxes this year rather than next year.
Our subsequent analysis exploits cross-sectional variation in gi;t and time-series
variation in t to explain return patterns in December and January. In particular,
we measure the extent to which temporary price pressure occurs in December and
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dissipates in January.16 We emphasize that the interest rate channel that our novel
formulation identies generates signicantly more variation in the predicted magni-
tude of the e¤ect than the tax rate channel (in fact, more than twice as much). The
predicted value of , based on realized values of the two rates in question, varies from
8 to 660 basis points over the sample. This variation is primarily due to interest rates.
If one were to x interest rates at their average level over the sample, only allowing
tax rates to vary, the resulting variation in  is much smaller (97 to 338 basis points),
roughly one-third of the variation in  seen in the sample we study.
2 Data
In this section, we provide a description of the key variables used for these empirical
tests. We rst explain the way we compute our two key explanatory variables, the
capital gains overhang, g, and the tax-selling premium, , and then describe the
various control variables we employ. As the sources for these variables are standard
datasets (CRSP, Compustat, TAQ, and the data from a large discount brokerage
studied in Odean (1998)), we leave a detailed description of the raw data to Section
1 of the online Appendix.
2.1 Tax-selling premium
In theory,  should be a function of the marginal investors capital gains tax rate and
interest rate. Our implementation computes the U.S. version of  using the one-year
Fama-Bliss interest rate and the maximum capital gains tax rate each year, available
from the Internal Revenue Service website.17 The U.K. version of  is computed using
the Bank of England base rate and the maximum capital gains tax rate each year,
available from the HM Revenue & Customs website.
16The mispricing we investigate in December is equal to the mispricing in January in terms of
dollars. However, when measured in returns, the alpha in December is not exactly equal to the
alpha in January because the base price on which the return occurs is di¤erent. Our empirical work
takes this di¤erence into account. However, our description of the intuition ignores this di¤erence
for simplicity.
17By using the rates that were applied for each year t in question, we ignore the possibility that
investors may anticipate that capital gains tax rates may change.
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Although the appropriate interest rate depends on the credit worthiness of the
marginal investor, we nd that di¤erent interest rates imply similar variation in the
U.S. version of . In the analysis that follows, we use the one-year Fama-Bliss interest
rate primarily because this proxy has a long time-series. Section 2 of the online
Appendix documents that using other interest-rate proxies that include an explicit
credit component, such as the rates on auto and personal loans, generates very similar
variation in  over most of the common sample period.
2.2 Capital gains overhang
In theory, the relevant capital gains overhang, gi;t, is that of the marginal seller, but
this value obviously cannot be identied. Therefore, we use the capital gains overhang
variable proposed by Grinblatt and Han (2005). They dene capital gains overhang
as the percentage deviation of a proxy for the stocks current reference price, RPi;t,
from the current price, Pi;t, where the proxy for a stocks current reference price
is estimated using a turnover-weighted sum of end-of-week prices over the past 260
weeks, where TOi;t is the turnover of stock i in week t. Specically, we measure TOi;t
as the sum of daily trading volume relative to shares outstanding. Suppressing the
subscript i for readability, the relevant equations are
gt =
Pt  RPt
Pt
with RPt = 
 1
260X
n=0
bVt;t nPt n
where bVt;t n = TOt n "n 1Y
=1
(1  TOt n+ )
#
and  =
260X
n=0
bVt;t n
Therefore, the weights, bVt;t n =, given to each past price, Pt n, can be interpreted as
the probability that the marginal seller bought the stock at that price, where bVt;t n is
a function of the past turnover from t n to t 1. Hence this probability is also equal
to the probability that the reference price is equal to the price at t   n. Averaging
over all possible reference prices yields the estimated cost basis.
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The capital gains overhang measure has the following intuitive interpretation.
If a stock had relatively high turnover exactly one year ago, but volume has been
very low ever since, then the current shareholders are more likely to have bought
the stock a year ago. Consequently, the price one year ago is a good proxy for the
marginal investors purchase price. Conversely, if that stock instead had relatively
high turnover in the most recent month, then last months price is a good proxy for
the marginal investors purchase price. Note that we compute g for each rm using
price and volume data from the CRSP database for U.S. rms and the Compustat
Global database for U.K. rms.
2.3 Control Variables
We conduct cross-sectional regressions using both returns and selling pressure as
dependent variables. The returns-based regressions consist primarily of daily rm-
level returns, which are obtained from the CRSP database for U.S. rms and from
Compustat Global for U.K. rms. The selling-pressure regressions, used for analyzing
investor behavior, are also conducted at the daily frequency. We compute selling
pressure, Sell, dened as the ratio of sell trades to all trades, following Lee and
Ready (1991) and Hvidkjaer (2005) using the TAQ database. We further compute
versions of selling pressure for small (SellS) and large (SellL) trades. Following Lee
and Ready (1991), we set the cuto¤ point separating a large trade from a small trade
at $10,000.
The key variables in our regression are a rms capital gains overhang and the
tax-selling premium. However, in most of the specications, we also include other
standard control variables. We include the book-to-market equity ratio (BM) in
the regressions in order to capture the well-known value e¤ect in the cross-section of
average stock returns (Fama and French (1992)). We control for size (ME) given the
evidence in Fama and French (1992) that size plays some role in describing the cross-
section of average returns. We control for past returns over the last three years and
trading volume as in Grinblatt and Han (2005), since our capital gains variable uses
both as inputs. In particular, we decompose returns over the last three years into the
one-month return, r 1:0; the one-year return (excluding the past one-month return),
r 12: 1; and the three-year return (excluding the past one-year return), r 36: 12. We
calculate two measures of volume. The rst is the average monthly turnover, V ,
from the past 12 months. The second is monthly turnover, TURN , which is simply
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the sum of daily turnover for the month in question. For both volume measures, note
that we divide Nasdaq volume by two in an attempt to minimize the double counting
of trades on that exchange.
2.4 Descriptive statistics of overhang portfolios
Though our analysis uses rm-level regressions, we rst look at the characteristics of
portfolios sorted on g to summarize how g varies in the cross-section and is related
to other variables used in the nance literature to forecast cross-sectional variation
in stock returns.
Table I reports equal-weight average characteristics for portfolios formed monthly
on capital gains overhang. We choose equal-weight to correspond to our rm-level
regressions which weight stocks equally. By denition, past returns are correlated
with stockscapital gains overhang.18 Nevertheless, it is interesting to see the extent
to which there is spread in past returns over di¤erent horizons because of the capital
gains overhang sort and the way that translates into characteristics that are indirectly
driven by past returns, SIZE and BM . We nd that high overhang stocks are
typically large value momentum stocks while low overhang stocks are typically small
growth losers. This tendency does not have to be true for every single stock (in
fact, our stock-level regressions hope to separate these two sources of independent
variation), but it is the case at the level of quintile portfolios. Note that seasonal
e¤ects have been documented in the average returns associated with many of these
variables. By suggesting that previous analyses merely identied a tax-selling seasonal
that varies through time, our framework provides an alternative explanation.
Also of particular interest is the fact that though there is no pattern in average
monthly turnover over the past year, there is a pattern in the most recent monthly
volume. Stocks with a low g experience relatively high turnover in December, while
18One possible concern is that variation in overhang is simply variation in momentum. In their
Table I Panel B, Grinblatt and Han (2005) study the cross-sectional determinants of the capital gains
overhang and show that about 59% of the cross-sectional variation in the capital gains variable can
be explained by di¤erences in past returns (over the past month, past year, and past three years),
past turnover (over the past month, past year, and past three years), and rm size. Given that more
than 40% of the variation remains unexplained and that all seven variables are each very signicant,
it is not just returns over the past year that are driving cross-sectional variation in overhang. Indeed,
the thesis of Grinblatt and Han (2005) is that overhang clearly and reliably drives out r 12: 1 in
cross-sectional regressions forecasting returns.
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stocks with a high g experience relatively high turnover in January. Even stronger
patterns can be seen in our selling pressure variable Sell. Stocks with a low cost
basis relative to price are being sold by both small (SellS) and large (SellL) investors
in December. These patterns are consistent with optimal tax-selling behavior in the
context we consider here.
3 Empirical Results
Our empirical analysis consists of three parts. First, we consider the ability of the
product of g and  to forecast cross-sectional and time-series variation in stock returns.
Second, we examine the implications for trading volume and the trading behavior of
individual investors. Finally, we analyze the consequences for aggregate returns and
performance attribution.
3.1 Cross-sectional and time-series variation in rm-level re-
turns
In this subsection, we focus on the analysis of the cross-sectional and time-series
variation in rm-level returns. In particular, we show that the product of the tax-
selling premium (, a function of capital gains rates and interest rates) and a stocks
capital gains overhang (g) forecasts rm-level returns around the turn of the tax year.
We rst examine U.S. data and then turn to the U.K., where the tax and calendar
year end do not coincide. In these regressions, we rst cross-sectionally demean all
rm-level data.
3.1.1 U.S. return regressions
Since our hypothesis has both cross-sectional and time-series implications, in Table
II we estimate pooled regressions examining whether the interaction between  and
g forecasts either weekly or daily returns. Panels A and B of Table II report the
main result; the remaining Panel estimates our benchmark specication over di¤erent
subsamples for robustness.
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We rst estimate a regression forecasting weekly returns using the product of 
and g, as well as interacting that variable with nine dummy variables, eight for the
four December and four January weeks and one for the rest of the year, February
through November,
ri;t = a1t 1gi;t 1FN (4)
+a2t 1gi;t 1D1 + a3t 1gi;t 1D2 + a4t 1gi;t 1D3 + a5t 1gi;t 1D4
+a6t 1gi;t 1J1 + a7t 1gi;t 1J2 + a8t 1gi;t 1J3 + a9t 1gi;t 1J4 + "i;t
Standard errors are robust to cross-sectional correlation using the method of
Rogers (1983, 1993).19 The rst regression in Panel A shows that the e¤ect of   g is
statistically signicant in December and January using weekly dummies. The results
are consistent with December momentum in stock returns which is explained by   g
and a subsequent reversal around the turn-of-the-year. Interestingly, the reversal
seems to start during the last week of December.
The remaining regressions in Panel A add standard controls to the specication in
equation (4). These controls includeME, BM , and g. These variables control for the
well-known size, value, and momentum patterns in the cross-section of returns. We
use g to control for momentum given Grinblatt and Hans nding that g subsumes
simple price momentums ability to describe the cross-section of average returns;
however, note that we do include controls for past returns in subsequent regressions.
We also interact ME with a dummy variable for January. Finally, we split the
interaction,   g  FN , into   g  FebJun and   g  JulNov.
These controls have little impact on our ndings as the turn-of-the-year e¤ect
remains strong. However, the last week rebound becomes smaller and statistically
insignicant. In all cases, we nd that most of the January reversal occurs in the
rst week of January. We nd that the ability of   g to predict returns in February
through November occurs entirely in the second-half of the year. This result is
consistent with the potential clumping of tax-loss harvesting investors trades being
partially anticipated by the market.
Panel B estimates a daily version of the fourth regression in Panel A in order to
19See Petersen (2009) for a careful study of the appropriateness of Rogers(1983, 1993) estimator
in various contexts.
15
shed more light on the e¤ect seen during the last week of December. We continue
to use weekly dummy variables to facilitate comparison with the weekly return re-
gressions of Panel A, but we also add dummies for the business day before December
25th (XE dummy) and the business day before New Years Day (NYE dummy). After
including these XE and NYE dummies, the last week of December exhibits a posi-
tive slope on the interaction   g. This result is consistent with tax-loss harvesting
by taxable investors throughout the last week of the year, but with savvy investors
purchasing temporarily depressed stocks on the last working days of the year.
Overall, Panels A and B suggest that tax-motivated selling, captured by the in-
teraction of   g, can explain the cross-section of rm level returns during the turn
of the year. We test for the joint signicance of December weekly coe¢ cients for
both Panels A and B, nding that December coe¢ cients are always jointly signicant
at the 1% level, with the exception of the second regression in Panel A, where the
December coe¢ cients are signicant at the 5% level. January coe¢ cients are jointly
statistically signicant at the 1% level for all regressions in Panels A and B.20
We consider regression (1) in Table II Panel B to be our benchmark specica-
tion. The remaining regressions in Table II use this specication to test alternative
hypotheses as well as document the robustness of our ndings to di¤erent subsamples.
One alternative hypothesis is that  is simply capturing a downward trend in
the capital gains overhang e¤ect, instead of the joint e¤ect of interest rates and
capital gains tax rates as specied in the formulation we derived. As a consequence,
regression (2) in Table II Panel B interacts a linear time trend (trend) with g. We
nd a negative and statistically signicant coe¢ cient on trendg, which is consistent
with a decreasing e¤ect of g. However, this interaction does not subsume the   g
e¤ect in December and January as coe¢ cients remain roughly the same in magnitude
and statistical signicance. Regression (3) in Panel B considers the possibility that
the interaction between g and the linear time trend di¤ers as a function of the week
of the year. This more exible trend specication still does not subsume the   g
e¤ect as coe¢ cients and t-statistics associated with   g remain strong in the weeks
around the turn of the year.
Another alternative hypothesis is that it is really only one component of  (either
20The test for (J1 + J2 + J3 + J4) + (D1 +D2 +D3 +D4) = 0 yields an F-statistic of 3.85 with
a p-value of 0.0499. Thus, we just reject the hypothesis that the sum of December and January
coe¢ cients are equal.
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the interest rate or the capital gains tax rate) that is providing the forecasting power.
Hence, we test whether interest rates (r) or tax rates () are individually important
in explaining the time-series variation in the capital gains overhang e¤ect. Regression
(4) in Table II Panel B shows that neither  nor r in isolation interacts with g in a
consistent fashion, providing additional support for our claim that  is the correct
conditioning variable.
In order to test the robustness of our results, we also estimate a regression with
the same specication as in Grinblatt and Han (2005) in regression (5) of Panel B. In
this regression we measure the seasonal pattern in our suggested variable,   g, while
controlling for patterns in average returns related to the one-month return, r 1:0, the
one-year return r 12: 1, the three-year return r 36: 12, the average monthly turnover
V over the past 12 months, and SIZE.21
ri;t = a1t 1gi;t 1FN
+a2t 1gi;t 1D1 + a3t 1gi;t 1D2 + a4t 1gi;t 1D3 + a5t 1gi;t 1D4
+a6t 1gi;t 1J1 + a7t 1gi;t 1J2 + a8t 1gi;t 1J3 + a9t 1gi;t 1J4
+a10gi;t 1 + a11ri; 1:0 + a12ri; 12: 1 + a13ri; 36: 12
+a14V i;t 1 + a15 lnMEi;t 1 + "i;t
Again we nd that the product of  and g predicts returns in a manner consistent
with our hypothesis.22
In Panel C of Table II, we re-estimate our benchmark regression over di¤erent
sub-periods. Consistent with our hypothesis,   g has the expected e¤ect around
the turn-of-the-year in all sub-periods.
21Grinblatt and Han (2005) use a slightly di¤erent measure of size than Fama and French (1992).
For consistencys sake, we use the appropriate denition in the corresponding specication. However,
we ignore the minor di¤erence between these two denitions of size when describing the results.
22We have re-estimated these equations using di¤erent tax rates, including both the average max-
imum tax rate and the average federal marginal tax rate from the NBERs TAXSIM dataset [see
Feenberg and Coutts (1993)]. Our conclusions remain qualitatively the same. We report results
using the maximum capital gains tax rate as that tax rate is available over the longest time period.
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3.1.2 U.K. return regressions
The fact that the turn-of-the-tax-year coincides with the turn-of-the-calendar-year in
the U.S. has resulted in a long debate as to whether tax-motivated trading or window
dressing is causing the turn-of-the-year e¤ect. Researchers have argued that window
dressing could explain similar return patterns as fund managers sell losers and buy
winners at the end of the reporting period to make their year-end portfolios look
strong. Our approach helps distinguish between these two hypotheses as there does
not seem to be any obvious reason that the magnitude of the window dressing e¤ect
would be related to time-series variation in .23 Nevertheless, we take this concern
seriously and turn to international data for further insight.
We test the same hypothesis with international data, choosing the U.K. because
its tax year does not coincide with the calendar year. Specically, the tax year in the
U.K. begins on the 6th of April and ends on the 5th of April of the next calendar year.
As a result, the U.K. provides a clean setup to test these two plausible hypotheses.
Any seasonality in the U.K. stock market around the turn-of-the-tax-year would be
strong evidence for tax-motivated trading causing seasonality in stock returns.
We are not the rst to use U.K. data to test the tax-selling hypothesis. In
particular, Reinganum and Shapiro (1987) show that after the introduction of capital
gains taxes in the U.K., the di¤erence in April returns between winners and losers
becomes signicantly greater than zero, consistent with a tax-loss selling story. Our
primary empirical contribution is to show that this premium varies with the interest
rate as predicted by our formulation.24
The results using U.K. data provide further evidence of tax-motivated trading,
as Table III shows results similar to Table II. Seasonality in U.K. returns indeed
occurs at the turn-of-the-tax-year and varies as a function of our tax-selling premium.
All coe¢ cients are positive in March and negative in April. Coe¢ cients are jointly
statistically signicant at the 1% level in both March and April.
23Other researchers have examined tax-motivated price pressure stories that occur at times other
than the turn of the year to rule out alternative explanations such as window dressing. See, for
example, Guenther and Willenborg (1999), Blouin, Raedy and Shackelford (2003), and Dai, Maydew,
Shackelford and Zhang (forthcoming).
24Other di¤erences include the fact that Reinganum and Shapiro (1987) examine only monthly
stock returns and use an arguably cruder proxy for a stocks capital gains overhang. In contrast,
we use daily returns and measure capital gains overhang as in Grinblatt and Han (2005).
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3.2 Cross-sectional and time-series variation in trading be-
havior
The time-series and cross-sectional patterns we have found in rm-level returns are
consistent with tax-motivated selling pressure. In this section, we examine further
implications of that explanation, particularly the way our suggested variables explain
seller-initiated volume and the behavior of individual investors. First, we examine all
trading volume at the turn of the year. Unlike previous research, we exploit a long
panel of trading data, namely the TAQ database, and categorize all trades over the
1993-2005 period as small or large, buy or sell.25 Second, we also examine trading
patterns by studying the actual trades of individual investors, obtained from Odeans
dataset, to conrm that these investors harvest (defer) capital losses (gains) based on
the level of our tax-selling premium.
3.2.1 Seller-initiated trading volume
We build on the results of the previous subsection to test our frameworks ability to
explain time-series and cross-sectional variation in seller-initiated trades as a whole
as well as in small and large trade subsets. We examine these subsets as previ-
ous research has argued that small trades are primarily from individuals while large
trades are primarily from institutions. We would expect negative overhang stocks to
have high selling pressure in December followed by low selling pressure in January.
Similarly, we expect the opposite e¤ect in the case of positive overhang stocks.
In Table IV, we forecast the level of selling pressure (Sell, SellS, SellL) in Panel
A and the rst di¤erence of those variables in Panel B. Throughout the Table, we
use the same independent variables as Table II Panel B regression (5). Specically,
we estimate
25In contrast, Sias and Starks (1997) use TAQ data from only December 1990 and January 1991
to examine a similar question.
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Selli;t = a1t 1gi;t 1FN (5)
+a2t 1gi;t 1D1 + a3t 1gi;t 1D2 + a4t 1gi;t 1D3 + a5t 1gi;t 1D4
+a6t 1gi;t 1J1 + a7t 1gi;t 1J2 + a8t 1gi;t 1J3 + a9t 1gi;t 1J4
+a10gi;t 1 + a11ri; 1:0 + a12ri; 12: 1 + a13ri; 36: 12
+a14V i;t 1 + a15 lnMEi;t 1 + "i;t
in Panel A and
Selli;t   Selli;t 1 = a1t 1gi;t 1FN (6)
+a2t 1gi;t 1D1 + a3t 1gi;t 1D2 + a4t 1gi;t 1D3 + a5t 1gi;t 1D4
+a6t 1gi;t 1J1 + a7t 1gi;t 1J2 + a8t 1gi;t 1J3 + a9t 1gi;t 1J4
+a10gi;t 1 + a11ri; 1:0 + a12ri; 12: 1 + a13ri; 36: 12
+a14V i;t 1 + a15 lnMEi;t 1 + "i;t
in Panel B. Note that we expect both Selli;t and Selli;t   Selli;t 1 to move in the
opposite direction of the predicted return; and, therefore, we now expect a positive
(negative) slope in January (December) on our tax-selling variable. As in the return
regressions, all rm-level variables are cross-sectionally demeaned. Standard errors
are robust to simultaneous correlation both across rms and across years based on
the method developed by Thompson (forthcoming).
We do nd that both returns and selling pressure exhibit similar seasonality, as
selling pressure results are consistent with the return regressions shown in Table II.
Panel A in Table IV reports the results from regressions forecasting the level of selling
pressure. We nd that December slopes on   g are all negative and highly statisti-
cally signicant, indicating taxable investors are selling negative overhang stocks and
holding on to positive overhang stocks in December. As expected, January exhibits
the opposite pattern.
For example, in the last week of December, the coe¢ cient on   g is -1.893 with
a t-statistic in excess of 11. Then, in the case of a negative overhang stock, selling
pressure reverses into buying pressure after the turn of the year as slopes on   g
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turn positive in January. Specically, we nd a reversal in selling pressure in the rst
week of January with a statistically-signicant coe¢ cient of 1.718. These results are
economically quite large, at least when compared to the coe¢ cient on   g of -0.001
throughout February and November. We also nd that the coe¢ cients associated
with the business days before Christmas and New Years Day are consistent with the
corresponding coe¢ cient estimates of the return regressions.
The analysis in Section 1 indicates that we should expect  g to forecast the level
of selling pressure. Nevertheless, we nd that results remain statistically signicant
even when we forecast changes in selling pressure. In this case, we are analyzing
whether the change in selling pressure of low/negative capital gains overhang stocks
increases as we approach the end of the year. Panel B shows that this increase
indeed occurs, as coe¢ cients in December are all negative. The selling pressure of
low overhang stocks increases over the course of December (negative coe¢ cients), but
suddenly declines in the rst week of January (positive coe¢ cient). Note that the
slope on the NYE dummy interaction is positive and highly statistically signicant,
implying a large change in selling pressure just before the turn of the year.
In both panels we also split the data into small and large trades. We do this
as past research (Lee and Ready (1991) and others) has associated small trades with
buying by individual investors and large trades with buying by institutional investors.
We nd the reversal in selling pressure to be strong and more statistically signicant
in the case of small trades, but present for both subsets. Though the results for
small and large trades are very similar, the January slopes in Panel A seem to be
slightly higher for small trades. Interestingly, the savvy buying pressure in the last
week of the year seems to come from institutional investors on Christmas Eve and
from individual investors on New Years Eve.
Past research has looked for similar links between returns and selling pressure.
Ritter (1988) nds that individual investors who are customers at Merrill Lynch
place more sell orders in December than in January. While this nding is consistent
with tax selling, a limitation is that it focuses only on a small subgroup of investors.
Sias and Starks (1997) show that individuals sell stocks at the end of the year. This
evidence is consistent with tax-motivated selling, but they nd the individuals also
sell past one-year winners in December. They view this result as inconsistent with
tax selling, but to the extent that return momentum is a poor proxy for capital gains
overhang, it may be di¢ cult to draw conclusions about tax-motivated selling from
their results. Another limitation of Sias and Starks (1997) is that they use TAQ data
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from only December 1990 and January 1991.
3.2.2 Actual individual trades
We examine trading patterns by studying the actual trades of individual investors to
conrm that these investors harvest (defer) capital losses (gains) based on the level
of our tax-selling variables. In particular, Figure 1 reports the results of what is
essentially a di¤erence-in-di¤erence test of the trading implications of equation (1).
That gure shows the di¤erence in the propensity to realize capital gains/losses in
December compared to January, for di¤erent levels of . In particular, we split the
sample into above-median and below-median .
We process all of the trades in the Odean dataset in the following way. We
follow each stock in the database from the time it was purchased until the time it
was eventually sold. We keep track of the close for that stock at the end of each
day in between the purchase date and the eventual sell date, using every closing price
to calculate an unrealized capital gain/loss. For each of eleven evenly-spaced bins
ranging from -100% to >100%, these unrealized gains and losses are then compared
to observed realized gains and losses to measure a tendency for investors to sell as a
function of capital gain/loss. Then for each bin, we subtract the January propensity
to sell from the December propensity to sell. These turn-of-the-year di¤erences to
sell are plotted separately for high  years and low  years. The average value of 
for the high  years subset is 0.040, while the average value of  for the low  years
subset is 0.022.
There are two strong conclusions to draw from the gure. First, investors tend
to accelerate the realization of capital losses in December (compared to January).
Second, this tendency is much higher in those years when  is higher. Together these
two facts conrm the central prediction of our conjecture: investorspropensity to
sell at the turn of the year depends on the product of the capital gains overhang,
g, and the tax-selling premium, , which is a function of the interest and tax rate
environment. Our framework also suggests that investors may delay realizing capital
gains in high  years. However, because of the non-linear relation between capital
gains and capital gain overhang, a relatively large capital gain results in a relatively
small amount of overhang. Consequently, one would not expect variation in  to
generate much variation in selling probabilities for stocks with unrealized capital
gains, and it does not.
22
3.3 Implications for performance attribution
Our analysis has tried to measure the rm-specic and aggregate variables that drive
cross-sectional and time-series patterns in average returns at the turn of the year. To
do so, we have used a particular measure of rm-specic capital gains overhang and
have controlled for other well-known patterns in the cross-section such as a stocks
size, its book-to-market equity ratio, and its return momentum that are known to be
correlated with our particular measure of a rms capital gains overhang.
However, given this correlation, a natural complementary question to ask is the fol-
lowing: To what extent can the tax-selling e¤ect drive market beta and the abnormal
return associated with bets on the size, book-to-market, and momentum character-
istics? To answer these questions, we rst document the extent to which the market
return can be forecast by our tax-selling variables. We then estimate conditional
CAPM time-series regressions pricing the three Fama-French/Carhart non-market
factors.
First, we test whether tax-motivated selling can explain aggregate returns in Jan-
uary. To do so, we measure gM , the value-weighted average of rm-level measures of
g. Table V shows that   gM does predict market returns in January in all of the
specications we consider. This e¤ect is both statistically and economically signi-
cant. Specically, based on the specication of Table V regression 1, a one standard
deviation increase in the joint product of   gM results in a decrease in the equity
premium of approximately one percent. We also report the results of specications
that control for the independent e¤ect of  or gM . Note that we nd a statistically
signicant relationship despite the inclusion of the aggregate book-to-market variable
in these regressions.
As we nd that market returns are indeed a¤ected by tax-selling behavior, we
estimate conditional CAPM time-series regressions that include   g as a condi-
tioning variable. In these regressions, we analyze the three Fama-French/Carhart
non-market factors. We choose these three factors because of their widespread use
in academic research. In particular, these factors represent more reasonable imple-
mentations of strategies based on size, book-to-market, or momentum characteristics
than the strategies implicit in our earlier cross-sectional regression tests. For compa-
rability, we create a zero-cost overhang factor that is formed in a similar way to the
momentum factor of Carhart. Specically, each month we sort all NYSE stocks on
our overhang measure and calculate 20th and 80th percentile breakpoints. We then
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buy all NYSE-AMEX-NASDAQ stocks that are below the NYSE 20th percentile and
sell all NYSE-AMEX-NASDAQ stocks that are above the NYSE 80th percentile.
The positions in the long and short sides are value-weight. Thus, we will be able to
show both the extent to which a tax-selling premium is a component of the premi-
ums on these well-known factors as well as the nature of the tax-selling premium on
value-weight positions based on a traditional sorting approach.
Figure 2 plots the January return on the TAX factor for each of the years of the
sample against an OLS forecast of the expected January return on the TAX factor
using the product of the tax-selling premium and the factors capital gains overhang,
 gTAX . As detailed in the Figure legend, the regression coe¢ cient in that regression
is -1.99 with an associated t-statistic of -3.52. That regressions adjusted R2 is 17.7%.
These statistics and this gure conrm that there is a time-series relation between
the January return on TAX and our predicted January rebound return as well as
documents that the average January return on TAX is positive.26 Moreover, these
results conrm that the general conclusion from the rm-level regression analysis is
robust to weighting rms by market capitalization.
The specication of our conditional CAPM regression follows from two of our
results. Specically, we have shown that 1) there is time-series and seasonal varia-
tion around the turn of the year in the cross-sectional premium for the capital gains
overhang variable and 2) this variation can be observed at the market level as well.
The rst nding indicates that our conditional CAPM regression should have the
intercept be a function of the trading strategys forecasted December dislocation and
January rebound. That premium, of course, will depend on the trading strategys
beginning-of-period capital gains overhang, the tax-selling premium which depends on
the beginning-of-period tax and interest rates, and the particular month in question,
as we derived in Section 1. Not only do we allow the alpha in our CAPM regression to
vary through time but we also consider time variation in the regressions market beta.
Cochrane (2001) points out that a time-varying CAPM beta only a¤ects pricing to the
extent that the beta is correlated with time-variation in the market premium. There-
26One could arguably attribute the large positive realized return (35%) on the TAX factor in
January 2001 to to the large negative return to a momentum strategy (-24%) in January as the tech
boom subsided. Regardless, the 2001 observation is not inuential. In fact the t-statistic and R2
increase to -4.72 and 29.08% respectively when that observation is dropped from the sample.
Note that the relation in Figure 2 continues to be statistically signicant if one instead predicts
CAPM-adjusted returns instead of raw returns as in the Figure. If one imposes a regression coe¢ -
cient of -1, the resulting intercept is statistically insignicant from zero under either benchmarking
approach.
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fore, the second nding (the markets tax-selling premium forecasts the subsequent
excess return on the market) indicates that our conditional CAPM regressions should
have a time-varying beta that is a function of the markets forecasted December dislo-
cation and January rebound. As at the rm level, that predictable return will depend
on the markets beginning-of-period capital gains overhang, the tax-selling premium
(which depends on the beginning-of-period tax and interest rates), and the particular
month in question.
Table VI summarizes the extent to which cross-sectional and time-series variation
in tax-selling premiums drive conditional alphas and betas for the three well-known
factor portfolios HML, SMB, UMD and our low-minus-high overhang portfolio, which
we denote as TAX. Note that we attribute performance of the returns on the actual
factors generated by Ken French (obtained from his web site). However, we can only
proxy for the capital gains overhang of Frenchs factors as not all of the stocks in
the factor portfolios have the necessary data our measure requires. In particular,
while our rm-level overhang measure requires ve years of price and volume data,
these strategies do not. Presumably, our ndings would be have been strengthened if
instead, we had priced the return on factors whose construction imposed a ve-year
data requirement as well.
The rst regression of each panel in Table VI rst documents the extent of season-
ality in the CAPM alpha of the factors being considered. For TAX, HML, and SMB,
a signicant portion of their average abnormal return occurs in January. Figure For
UMD, the strong average returns outside of the turn of the year are partially o¤set
by a very large negative premium in January.
The second regression of each panel in Table VI then demonstrates that variation
in the markets tax-selling e¤ect drives beta at the turn of the year. For the three
factor portfolios TAX, HML, and SMB, when the markets forecasted tax-selling
January rebound,   gM , is relatively high, January betas are predictably relatively
high as well.27 In each of these cases, December betas are correspondingly relatively
low, though only the SMB estimate is statistically signicant. As one might expect
from the evidence in Table I, we nd the opposite e¤ect for the momentum portfolio.
The January beta for the momentum portfolio is predictably higher when the markets
tax-selling premium is relatively low. Since Table V shows that the markets tax-
27For the sake of interpretability, we normalize the time-series   gM so that the coe¢ cients on
RMRF represent the average beta during the months in question and the coe¢ cient on   gM 
RMRF represent the change in beta for a one standard deviation move in   gM .
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selling premium forecasts the excess return on the market, it is not surprising that
controlling for this conditional beta e¤ect reduces the absolute magnitude of the alpha
of these four trading strategies in January.
Figure 3 uses higher-frequency estimates of the beta of the components of the
TAX bet to conrm that the link between the market risk of the TAX bet and the
markets forecasted tax-selling January rebound return is particularly present in the
days surrounding the turn of the year. Specically, Figure 3 graphs ve-day rolling
betas throughout December and January for low, middle, and high overhang quintile
portfolios.28 When the market has a relatively high forecasted January rebound
because of both a large capital loss in December and high tax and interest rates, low
overhang stocks covary much more with the market in the days subsequent to the
turn of the year than do high overhang stocks.
Similarly, Figure 3 conrms that the predictability in daily returns and selling pres-
sure depends on the markets expected January rebound return. Figure 3 shows that
patterns in both daily returns and selling pressure are stronger when the tax-selling
e¤ect in the market return is stronger. Specically, when the markets expected
January rebound return,    gM , is large, low overhang stocks display much higher
selling pressure in December and more strongly outperform high overhang stocks in
January.29 Again these results are more concentrated on the days very close to the
turn of the year.
The third regression of each panel in Table VI not only controls for time-varying
28We compute betas for the capital gains overhang quintile portfolios as follows. Trading days
are numbered (between -20 and +20) around the turn of each year such that 0 is the last trading
day in December and +1 is the rst trading day in January. Betas are then computed versus the
CRSP value-weighted market portfolio for each trading day. Thus, the day(0) beta accounts for the
covariance between quintile portfolio returns and market returns on the last trading day of each
year. This procedure yields a series of 41 trading day betas for each quintile portfolio. We then use
these series to compute trailing ve-day moving averages for each quintile portfolio.
Note that Figure 3 plots the daily moving average betas conditional on the markets tax-selling
alpha. Thus, the procedure described above is slightly modied so that the trading day betas
are computed separately for years with positive versus negative expected January market rebound
return. Our split compares positive versus negative rather than simply high versus low values of the
January rebound return to be consistent with the corresponding regression (3) of Table 6 Panel A.
29The di¤erence between the cumulative January return for the low overhang portfolio and the
high overhang portfolio is 4.00% during years of a low expected January rebound return for the
market and 8.72% during years of a high expected January rebound return for the market. Each of
these di¤erences is statistically signicant at the 1% level. Moreover, the di¤erence between these
cumulative returns of 4.72% is signicant at the 5% level (t-statistic of 2.09).
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beta but also attributes a portion of the remaining conditional alpha to our strategy-
specic tax selling premium variable. We nd that though January alphas remain
economically and statistically signicant, they are reduced signicantly in the case of
SMB and UMD. The January alpha for SMB is reduced by 44%, while the January
alpha for UMD is reduced by 37%. Interestingly, for two of the three factors, SMB
and UMD, the non-tax alpha from February to November becomes statistically in-
signicant. However, the point estimate of the HML non-tax alpha from February to
November actually increases, though by less than 13%.
In summary, Table VI shows that a portion of the risk and abnormal return of
the Fama-French/Carhart non-market factors can be linked to our tax-selling pre-
mium, as the tax-selling e¤ect is strong in both market and factor portfolios. These
ndings have important implications for those researchers examining economic stories
describing time-variation in the properties of these factors.30
4 Conclusions
Our framework implies that temporary distortion in stock prices may arise because of
the taxation of capital gains. In particular, we exploit the tradeo¤ a rational investor
faces when realizing tax losses (gains) this tax year instead of next tax year in the
presence of temporary downward (upward) price pressure. Optimal tax selling can
generate stock return overreaction at the end of the tax year and a corresponding
reversal at the beginning of the subsequent tax year. The magnitude of these pre-
dictable returns is not only a function of a stocks tax basis but also a function of
interest rates and capital gains tax rates, which together bound the temporary dis-
tortion. The vast amount of literature on tax-selling at the turn of the year ignores
time-series variation in the e¤ect. The two previous papers (Poterba and Weisbenner
(2001) and Grinblatt and Moskowitz (2004)) that do examine time-series variation in
the e¤ect only look at variation resulting from the tax rate. The interest rate channel
30For example, Chordia and Shivakumar (2004) argue that returns on momentum strategies can
be explained once they are adjusted for the predictability of stock returns based on macroeconomic
variables. These variables include the interest rate which is an important component of our tax-
selling premium. Cooper, Gutierrez, and Hameed (2004) forecast returns on momentum strategies
with the state of the market, which they dene as whether the past three-year return on the market
is positive or negative. That denition is clearly related to our measure of market overhang, gM ,
that drives seasonal patterns in risk for the momentum factor.
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that we identify generates signicantly more variation in the predicted magnitude of
the e¤ect than the tax rate channel (in fact, more than twice as much).
A variety of empirical evidence conrms this prediction. We document patterns
in the cross-section of average returns at the turn of the tax year that are consistent
with our story. Our main tests use U.S. data, but additional tests using U.K. data
provide an important out-of-sample conrmation, as the U.K. tax and calendar year
end di¤er. We also identify trading patterns that are consistent with tax-motivated
selling driving these temporary movements in stock prices. Stocks with low capital
gains overhang have more selling pressure in individualstrades at the turn of the tax
year than stocks with high capital gains overhang, and this imbalance also varies with
the same function of interest rates and capital gains tax rates. Moreover, in the actual
trades of investors using a large discount brokerage, the tendency to harvest losses in
December rather than in January also varies with this bound. Finally, we nd that
these e¤ects are also present in aggregate returns. As a consequence, performance
attribution at the turn of the year is not only a¤ected by the rm-level tradeo¤, but
also by distortion in measuring risk arising from this tax-selling based common factor.
Interestingly, our emphasis on the importance of the interest rate also explains
why recent returns to strategies exploiting that phenomenon have been low. These
low returns are not due to savvy investors eliminating the e¤ect, but instead are
explained by the rather low interest rates in the recent data. As interest rates rise,
our formulation predicts that the January e¤ect should return.
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Table I: Descriptive Statistics
This table reports various characteristics of capital-gains-overhang-sorted quintile portfolios formed
each month. These portfolios are equal-weight portfolios. We compute capital gains overhang, g,
as in Grinblatt and Han (2005). The characteristics include a decomposition of returns over the
last three years into the one-month return, r 1: 0; the one-year return (excluding the past one-
month return), r 12: 1; and the three-year return (excluding the past one-year return), r 12: 36.
Market capitalization, ME, and the book-to-market equity ratio, BM , are computed as in Fama
and French (1992). BM is the previous scal years ending book value divided by the corresponding
years December market value. ME is the latest end-of-June market value in thousands. We also
report the average monthly turnover, V , from the past 12 months as well as the monthly turnover,
TURN , the sum of daily turnover within the past month. For both volume measures, we divide
Nasdaq volume by two in an attempt to make volume numbers comparable across exchanges. We
compute Sell as the fraction of seller-initiated trades relative to all trades for both small (S) and
large (L) trades. The cut-o¤ delimiting a small versus a large trade is $10,000, as in Lee and Ready
(1991). The sample starts in February of 1954 and ends in December 2008.
Panel A: December
g r 1:0 r 12: 1 r 36: 12 ME BM V TURN SellS SellL
H 0.28 0.043 0.512 0.717 1856 0.66 0.043 0.047 0.51 0.52
4 0.09 0.023 0.251 0.494 2015 0.78 0.054 0.052 0.52 0.51
3 -0.07 0.011 0.124 0.391 1546 0.87 0.057 0.054 0.53 0.52
2 -0.33 0.000 0.000 0.294 887 0.97 0.055 0.055 0.56 0.54
L -1.90 -0.021 -0.198 0.065 190 1.29 0.044 0.053 0.61 0.57
Panel B: January
g r 1:0 r 12: 1 r 36: 12 ME BM V TURN SellS SellL
H 0.30 0.054 0.544 0.741 1719 0.68 0.039 0.052 0.51 0.52
4 0.11 0.042 0.264 0.505 1955 0.79 0.050 0.058 0.52 0.51
3 -0.03 0.040 0.133 0.402 1529 0.87 0.053 0.058 0.52 0.51
2 -0.27 0.048 0.016 0.318 936 0.97 0.054 0.057 0.52 0.51
L -1.70 0.082 -0.170 0.085 195 1.27 0.043 0.043 0.54 0.54
Panel C: February-November
g r 1:0 r 12: 1 r 36: 12 ME BM V TURN SellS SellL
H 0.29 0.040 0.527 0.681 1672 0.69 0.040 0.050 0.51 0.52
4 0.12 0.018 0.266 0.461 1972 0.80 0.051 0.055 0.51 0.51
3 -0.02 0.008 0.132 0.369 1660 0.87 0.054 0.055 0.52 0.51
2 -0.24 0.000 0.008 0.287 956 0.96 0.054 0.052 0.53 0.52
L -1.48 -0.008 -0.189 0.065 198 1.23 0.044 0.040 0.55 0.55
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Table II: Pooled Return Regression Estimates: 1954-2008
We report the results from pooled regressions of day or week t stock returns on t  1 characteristics.
Characteristics are measured on a weekly basis for conciseness. All rm-specic variables, dened
in Table I, are cross-sectionally demeaned, and when appropriate, interacted with our proposed tax-
selling premium variable, t =  t

1 Bt
1 Btt

, a function of capital gains tax rates ( t) and interest
rates (rt = 1Bt   1) as derived in Section 1 of the paper, and with dummy variables for di¤erent
periods of the year. The dummy variables are FN , D(W ), and J(W ) for February-November,
December, and January respectively and refer to the month of the return being predicted, with W
indicating the week of the particular month in question. T -statistics (in parentheses) are robust to
cross-correlation in the residuals using the clustered standard errors of Rogers (1983, 1993). We also
consider a case where we split the dummy variable FN into two halves: FebJun and JulNov. The
sample starts in February of 1954 and ends in December 2008. Panel A presents weekly regressions
of returns on weekly interactions of weekly dummies, g and , also including g, ME and BM as
controls. Panel B reports daily return regressions using weekly variables for conciseness and direct
comparison with Panel A. We expand the set of interactions to also include dummies for the business
day before Christmas (XE) and the business day before New Years Day (NY E). Regression (2) in
Panel B accounts for a possible trend in the e¤ect of g on returns. Regression (3) in Panel B considers
the possibility that the trend depends on the month, week, or day of the year. Regression (4) in
Panel B analyzes whether the interactive e¤ect of  can be explained simply through interactions
with its components, capital gains tax rates () or interest rates (r) individually. Regression (5) in
Panel B considers an alternative set of controls using the same variables as in Grinblatt and Han
(2005), also dened in Table I. Panel C shows sub-sample analysis of the rst regression in Panel
B. The regressions correspond to the sub-periods 1963-2008, 1954-2008, 1980-2008, and 1993-2008
respectively. For Panel A, these regressions generally take the form
ri;t = a1t 1gi;t 1FN
+a2t 1gi;t 1D1 + a3t 1gi;t 1D2 + a4t 1gi;t 1D3 + a5t 1gi;t 1D4
+a6t 1gi;t 1J1 + a7t 1gi;t 1J2 + a8t 1gi;t 1J3 + a9t 1gi;t 1J4
+a4gi;t 1 + a5 lnMEi;t 1 + a6 lnBMi;t 1 + "i;t.
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Panel A
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
  g  FN -0.035 -0.024 0.056 0.054
(-3.91) (-2.63) (2.68) (2.60)
  g D1 0.135 0.126 0.207 0.205 0.204
(1.71) (1.57) (2.50) (2.49) (2.48)
  g D2 0.155 0.127 0.208 0.206 0.202
(3.08) (2.02) (3.21) (3.19) (3.06)
  g D3 0.216 0.219 0.299 0.298 0.294
(4.51) (4.04) (4.97) (4.96) (4.90)
  g D4 -0.134 -0.159 -0.079 -0.081 -0.076
(-2.27) (-2.50) (-1.20) (-1.22) (-1.15)
  g  J1 -1.000 -1.009 -0.927 -0.913 -0.914
(-5.08) (-5.38) (-5.02) (-4.98) (-4.99)
  g  J2 -0.391 -0.383 -0.301 -0.286 -0.286
(-3.05) (-2.79) (-2.27) (-2.17) (-2.19)
  g  J3 -0.271 -0.244 -0.162 -0.146 -0.149
(-2.73) (-3.07) (-2.00) (-1.85) (-1.87)
  g  J4 -0.312 -0.300 -0.219 -0.203 -0.199
(-4.81) (-4.17) (-2.89) (-2.70) (-2.66)
  g  FebJun 0.015
(0.62)
  g  JulNov 0.086
(4.13)
g -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(-4.01) (-4.01) (-4.00)
ln(ME) -0.020 -0.012 -0.009 -0.011
(-3.11) (-1.87) (-1.34) (-1.65)
ln(BM) 0.057 0.049 0.049 0.022
(3.13) (2.68) (2.68) (1.60)
ln(ME)  J -0.044 -0.045
(-8.95) (-8.94)
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Panel B
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
interact dummies replace 
with both with both
  g g  trend  r
  g  FN 0.007 -0.003 -0.002 -1.5E-05 0.115 -0.004 0.006
(1.95) (-0.66) (-0.50) (-2.86) (4.58) (-1.81) (1.72)
  g D1 0.036 0.025 0.021 7.6E-06 0.059 -0.015 0.040
(2.24) (1.58) (1.19) (0.48) (0.42) (-2.53) (2.46)
  g D2 0.028 0.017 0.021 -2.9E-05 0.173 -0.008 0.038
(1.39) (0.87) (1.08) (-2.25) (0.93) (-2.95) (2.43)
  g D3 0.055 0.044 0.030 4.9E-05 0.105 -0.005 0.057
(4.64) (3.49) (3.14) (2.24) (0.46) (-1.73) (5.49)
  g D4 0.044 0.033 0.033 -1.2E-05 0.352 -0.007 0.048
(4.41) (3.28) (3.42) (-0.84) (2.46) (-1.58) (4.11)
  g  J1 -0.173 -0.184 -0.174 -5.3E-05 -0.181 -0.004 -0.171
(-5.04) (-5.13) (-5.33) (-1.15) (-0.45) (-0.69) (-4.89)
  g  J2 -0.039 -0.050 -0.039 -6.0E-05 0.063 -0.011 -0.044
(-2.43) (-2.90) (-2.63) (-1.55) (0.33) (-1.44) (-2.84)
  g  J3 -0.023 -0.034 -0.035 -9.6E-06 0.020 0.000 -0.032
(-1.71) (-2.35) (-2.60) (-0.41) (0.13) (0.24) (-1.91)
  g  J4 -0.038 -0.048 -0.052 4.1E-06 0.068 -0.007 -0.056
(-2.56) (-3.15) (-3.26) (0.21) (0.30) (-5.45) (-3.78)
  g XE -0.126 -0.126 -0.122 -4.8E-06 -0.507 0.007 -0.133
(-6.61) (-6.61) (-6.29) (-0.14) (-1.61) (2.09) (-6.98)
  g NY E -0.263 -0.263 -0.235 -1.2E-04 -0.895 -0.008 -0.277
(-3.85) (-3.85) (-3.30) (-1.96) (-1.25) (-8.61) (-4.48)
g -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.004 -0.001
(-7.52) (-2.48) (-2.71) (-4.55) (-8.34)
g  trend -1.6E-05
(-2.85)
ln(ME) -0.006 -0.007 -0.007 0.000
(-5.22) (-5.53) (-5.92) (-0.20)
ln(BM) 0.009 0.011 0.005 -0.003
(2.50) (3.17) (1.69) (-1.21)
ln(ME)  J -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 0.001
(-8.86) (-8.87) (-8.81) (0.41)
r 1:0 -0.003
(-6.02)
r 12: 1 0.000
(4.46)
r 36: 12 0.000
(-2.00)
V -0.001
(-3.03)
ln(ME) -0.007
(-5.72)
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Panel C
1963-2008 1954-1980 1980-2008 1993-2008
(1) (2) (3) (4)
*g*FN 0.008 0.002 0.002 -0.049
(2.14) (0.32) (0.34) (-4.24)
*g*D1 0.036 0.043 0.021 0.034
(2.26) (2.69) (1.14) (1.00)
*g*D2 0.029 0.047 0.006 -0.002
(1.42) (3.91) (0.27) (-0.08)
*g*D3 0.055 0.025 0.065 0.169
(4.68) (2.77) (3.36) (2.07)
*g*D4 0.045 0.040 0.036 0.064
(4.46) (3.04) (2.59) (1.42)
*g*J1 -0.169 -0.201 -0.165 -0.516
(-5.02) (-6.67) (-3.30) (-15.01)
*g*J2 -0.037 -0.046 -0.042 -0.201
(-2.33) (-3.38) (-1.70) (-2.00)
*g*J3 -0.021 -0.042 -0.020 -0.142
(-1.61) (-2.49) (-1.24) (-3.58)
*g*J4 -0.037 -0.076 -0.028 -0.111
(-2.48) (-3.24) (-1.84) (-3.64)
*g*XE -0.124 -0.109 -0.139 -0.192
(-6.63) (-4.09) (-5.28) (-2.39)
*g*NYE -0.262 -0.320 -0.222 -0.845
(-3.84) (-8.45) (-2.33) (-3.80)
g -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000
(-7.57) (-0.94) (-6.32) (-1.75)
ln(ME) -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.017
(-5.31) (-3.48) (-4.68) (-6.74)
ln(BM) 0.013 -0.002 0.016 0.003
(3.34) (-0.40) (3.21) (1.29)
ln(ME)*J -0.009 -0.010 -0.008 -0.006
(-8.67) (-7.11) (-6.38) (-3.94)
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Table III: Pooled Return Regression Estimates: 1954-2008
We report the results from pooled regressions of day t stock returns on t   1 characteristics using
U.K. data. Characteristics are measured on a weekly basis for conciseness. All rm-specic vari-
ables, dened in Table I but computed with U.K. data, are cross-sectionally demeaned, and when
appropriate, interacted with our proposed tax-selling premium variable , dened in Table II but
computed with U.K. data, along with monthly or weekly dummy variables. The dummy variables
are RoY and UK(X) for the rest of the tax year and specic weeks of the tax year respectively,
with X representing the week of the tax year. Since the end of the tax year in the U.K. is the 5th of
April, we dene these weeks in relation to the end of the tax year. Therefore, the last week of the
year is in e¤ect the last 5 days before the end of the tax year, including days in April and March
potentially. T -statistics (in parentheses) are robust to cross-correlation in the residuals using the
clustered standard errors of Rogers (1983, 1993). The sample starts in January 1996 and ends in
December 2008. The full specication of the regression takes the form
ri;t = a1t 1gi;t 1RoY
+a2t 1gi;t 1UK49 + a3t 1gi;t 1UK50 + a4t 1gi;t 1UK51 + a5t 1gi;t 1UK51
+a6t 1gi;t 1UK1 + a7t 1gi;t 1UK2 + a8t 1gi;t 1UK3 + a9t 1gi;t 1UK4
+a10 lnMEi;t 1 + a11 lnBMi;t 1 + a12ri; 1:0 + a13ri; 12: 1 + a14ri; 36: 12 + "i;t.
(1) (2)
  g RoY 0.032 0.041
(1.58) (1.71)
  g  UK49 0.131 0.142
(2.02) (2.14)
  g  UK50 0.176 0.187
(2.30) (2.38)
  g  UK51 0.058 0.068
(0.40) (0.47)
  g  UK52 0.050 0.061
(0.61) (0.72)
  g  UK1 -0.124 -0.112
(-1.41) (-1.28)
  g  UK2 -0.231 -0.221
(-2.47) (-2.33)
  g  UK3 -0.223 -0.212
(-2.34) (-2.20)
  g  UK4 -0.079 -0.067
(-1.44) (-1.19)
ln(ME) 0.000
(1.71)
ln(BM) 0.045
(1.50)
r 1:0 0.000
(0.07)
r 12: 1 0.001
(1.18)
r 36: 12 -0.001
(-2.69)
Table IV: Pooled Selling Pressure Regression Estimates: 1993-2005
We report the results from pooled regressions of the day t change in (or level of) selling pressure
(for either small or large sized trades) on t   1 characteristics. Characteristics are measured on a
weekly basis for conciseness. Panel A reports results with the level of selling pressure, while Panel
B shows results with the change in that level. In both cases, we split the sample into small and
large trades. All rm-specic variables, dened in Table I, are cross-sectionally demeaned, and when
appropriate, then interacted with our tax-selling premium variable, , and with dummy variables
corresponding to di¤erent periods of the year. These dummy variables as well as  are dened in
Table II. T -statistics (in parentheses) are robust to simultaneous correlation both across rms and
across years based on the method developed by Thompson (forthcoming). The sample starts in
February of 1993 and ends in January 2005. The specications of these regressions are consistent
with regression (5) of Panel B Table II and take the form
Selli;t = a1t 1gi;t 1FN
+a2t 1gi;t 1D1 + a3t 1gi;t 1D2 + a4t 1gi;t 1D3 + a5t 1gi;t 1D4
+a6t 1gi;t 1J1 + a7t 1gi;t 1J2 + a8t 1gi;t 1J3 + a9t 1gi;t 1J4
+a10t 1gi;t 1XE + a11t 1gi;t 1NY E + a12gi;t 1
+a13ri; 1:0 + a14ri; 12: 1 + a15ri; 36: 12 + a16V + a17 lnMEi;t 1 + "i;t,
Selli;t   Selli;t 1 = a1t 1gi;t 1FN
+a2t 1gi;t 1D1 + a3t 1gi;t 1D2 + a4t 1gi;t 1D3 + a5t 1gi;t 1D4
+a6t 1gi;t 1J1 + a7t 1gi;t 1J2 + a8t 1gi;t 1J3 + a9t 1gi;t 1J4
+a10t 1gi;t 1XE + a11t 1gi;t 1NY E + a12gi;t 1
+a13ri; 1:0 + a14ri; 12: 1 + a15ri; 36: 12 + a16V + a17 lnMEi;t 1 + "i;t.
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Panel A Panel B
all small large all small large
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
  g  FN -0.001 -0.080 -0.799 -0.020 -0.027 -0.013
(-0.01) (-0.48) (-3.98) (-1.29) (-1.6) (-0.44)
  g D1 -0.946 -1.165 -1.201 -0.126 -0.146 0.015
(-4.67) (-4.75) (-4.26) (-1.42) (-2.02) (0.12)
  g D2 -0.965 -1.304 -1.151 -0.040 -0.081 0.002
(-6.93) (-5.8) (-7.11) (-0.77) (-1.7) (0.02)
  g D3 -1.380 -1.608 -1.859 -0.141 -0.142 -0.225
(-8.88) (-7.52) (-10.54) (-1.97) (-1.96) (-1.5)
  g D4 -1.893 -1.965 -2.241 -0.176 -0.079 -0.233
(-11.18) (-9.36) (-9.84) (-3.03) (-1.71) (-1.5)
  g  J1 1.718 1.650 1.035 0.487 0.421 0.242
(4.18) (3.96) (2.72) (3.27) (2.73) (2.15)
  g  J2 0.966 0.875 0.055 -0.089 -0.045 -0.181
(5.93) (5.4) (0.37) (-1.17) (-0.59) (-2.98)
  g  J3 0.747 0.713 -0.250 0.107 0.048 0.214
(4.5) (3.67) (-1.16) (3.37) (1.56) (3.95)
  g  J4 0.587 0.543 -0.194 0.066 0.080 0.148
(3.86) (2.66) (-0.81) (1.14) (1.54) (1.59)
  g XE 0.390 0.207 1.173 0.090 0.006 0.954
(2.6) (1.71) (4.29) (0.46) (0.04) (4.01)
  g NY E 0.230 0.593 0.198 0.521 0.675 0.660
(1.51) (4.22) (0.74) (4.2) (4.71) (1.5)
g -0.001 -0.001 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.000
(-1.88) (-2.4) (3.69) (-0.41) (-0.72) (-0.89)
r 1:0 -0.008 0.003 -0.010 0.012 0.011 0.012
(-3.95) (1.03) (-4.78) (7.2) (8.32) (7.49)
r 12: 1 -0.002 -0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(-1.61) (-2.29) (-0.16) (1.54) (2.14) (2.26)
r 36: 12 -0.001 -0.003 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
(-1.16) (-2.84) (1.58) (0.4) (-0.05) (-0.32)
V -0.060 -0.018 -0.071 0.000 0.001 -0.001
(-4.55) (-1.65) (-7.61) (0.7) (0.93) (-1.17)
ln(ME) -1.666 -1.410 -1.495 0.031 0.029 0.012
(-13.33) (-10.48) (-12.32) (6.91) (8.53) (1.66)
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Table V: Aggregate Time-Series Regression Estimates: 1954-2008
We report the results from monthly regressions forecasting the excess return on the market portfolio
with our tax-selling premium variable, , dened in Table 2 and the value-weight average, gM , of
the rm-level capital gains overhang, g, dened in Table I. We also include in these regression the
value-weight average, BMM , of the rm-level book-to-market ratio, BM , also dened in Table I.
The sample starts in February of 1954 and ends in December 2008. The regression specication that
includes the union of all of the independent variables we consider would be
RMRFt = a0 + a1t 1gM;t 1FN + a2t 1gM;t 1D + a3t 1gM;t 1J
+a4gM;t 1FN + a5gM;t 1D + a6gM;t 1J
+a7t 1FN + a8t 1D + a9t 1J + a10BMM;t 1 + " i;t.
Int.   gM gM  BMM R2
FN D J FN D J FN D F
-0.761 0.426 1.406 -3.742 0.771 0.012
(-1.63) (0.63) (0.86) (-2.04) (1.64)
-0.797 -1.304 -2.155 -7.359 0.052 0.104 0.098 0.804 0.025
(-1.71) (-1.20) (-0.76) (-2.16) (2.18) (1.66) (1.38) (1.71)
-1.263 0.612 1.012 -5.550 -0.438 -0.169 0.255 1.283 0.031
(-2.48) (0.89) (0.60) (-2.81) (-2.93) (-0.60) (0.86) (2.50)
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Table VI: Portfolio Time-Series Regression Estimates: 1954-2008
We report the results from monthly regressions forecasting the CAPM alpha for four factor portfolios
using the portfolio-specic tax-selling capital gains overhang. RMRF is the excess return on the
market portfolio. We form the low-minus-high-overhang portfolio, TAX, by going long a value-
weight portfolio of the bottom twenty percent of stocks and short a value-weight portfolio of the
top twenty percent of stocks, in each case based on NYSE breakpoints. HML (high minus low
book-to-market) and SMB (small minus big size) portfolio returns are constructed as in Fama and
French (1993). We construct our momentum portfolio in the same way Ken French constructs his
UMD portfolio. Our measurement of each factors capital gains overhang comes from portfolios
that only include stocks that have capital gains overhang data available. However, we forecast the
returns on the factors that are available from Ken Frenchs website. We interact RMRF with
our measure of the markets capital gains overhang, gM , described in Table V. Dummy variables
corresponding to periods of the year as well as our tax-selling premium variable, , are also included
in the interactions. These dummy variables as well as  are dened in Table II. The time-series of the
RMRF interaction,   gM , is standardized to aid interpretability. The sample starts in February
of 1954 and ends in December 2008.
Panel A: TAX Panel B: HML
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Intercept  FN -0.027 -0.027 -0.028 0.002 0.002 0.003
(-14.32) (-14.70) (-10.32) (2.59) (2.55) (1.96)
Intercept D -0.037 -0.032 -0.031 0.003 0.003 0.000
(-6.07) (-4.99) (-3.46) (1.00) (0.97) (0.06)
Intercept  J 0.030 0.025 0.009 0.015 0.013 0.012
(4.95) (4.12) (0.96) (4.94) (4.35) (2.71)
  g  FN -0.036 0.019
(-0.28) (0.30)
  g D 0.038 -0.158
(0.11) (-0.88)
  g  J -1.124 -0.055
(-2.37) (-0.23)
RMRF  FN 0.284 0.285 -0.165 -0.165
(6.35) (6.37) (-7.38) (-7.37)
RMRF D 0.004 0.002 -0.159 -0.149
(0.02) (0.01) (-1.77) (-1.64)
RMRF  J 0.261 0.224 -0.142 -0.144
(2.08) (1.77) (-2.27) (-2.28)
  gM RMRF  FN -0.025 -0.026 0.022 0.023
(-1.03) (-1.05) (1.84) (1.86)
  gM RMRF D -0.395 -0.387 -0.086 -0.120
(-2.41) (-2.14) (-1.05) (-1.32)
  gM RMRF  J 0.382 0.268 0.090 0.084
(6.08) (3.38) (2.87) (2.13)
RMRF 0.297 -0.163
(7.15) (-8.07)
R2 0.32 0.35 0.37 0.12 0.13 0.13
Panel C: SMB Panel D: UMD
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Intercept  FN 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.009 0.008 0.008
(0.11) (0.00) (0.85) (5.57) (5.53) (3.73)
Intercept D 0.002 0.003 0.008 0.020 0.017 0.014
(0.47) (0.90) (1.54) (4.02) (3.28) (1.95)
Intercept  J 0.021 0.019 0.007 -0.016 -0.014 -0.006
(5.70) (5.16) (1.23) (-3.33) (-2.86) (-0.82)
  g  FN 0.090 -0.010
(1.17) (-0.10)
  g D 0.272 -0.152
(1.27) (-0.52)
  g  J -0.837 0.555
(-2.95) (1.43)
RMRF  FN 0.127 0.125 -0.067 -0.067
(4.75) (4.69) (-1.85) (-1.84)
RMRF D 0.015 -0.003 0.042 0.052
(0.14) (-0.03) (0.28) (0.35)
RMRF  J 0.056 0.028 -0.019 -0.001
(0.74) (0.37) (-0.19) (-0.01)
  gM RMRF  FN 0.032 0.034 0.074 0.074
(2.20) (2.30) (3.75) (3.73)
  gM RMRF D -0.177 -0.119 0.356 0.324
(-1.80) (-1.11) (2.66) (2.20)
  gM RMRF  J 0.162 0.077 -0.207 -0.151
(4.31) (1.64) (-4.05) (-2.33)
RMRF 0.114 -0.091
(4.64) (-2.70)
R2 0.08 0.12 0.15 0.09 0.11 0.12
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Figure 1: This gure shows the propensity of taxable investor to sell winners and losers at the
turn of the year using the dataset studied in Odean (1998). For each stock in the dataset, we
calculate a unrealized capital gain/loss from the time the investor purchased the stock until it was
eventually sold. For each of eleven evenly-spaced bins ranging from -100% to > 100%, we compare
these unrealized gains and losses to observed gains and losses. We then plot the di¤erence in the
percentage of realized gains and losses in December versus January, where the percentage is averaged
over each return bucket. The data is split into years that are predicted to have either a low or a
high tax-selling propensity for the market portfolio,    g(M), as discussed in the paper. The
solid-dotted line represents the December propensity minus the January propensity for the years
where the tax-selling propensity is predicted to be low and the solid line represents the December
propensity minus the January propensity for the years where the tax-selling propensity is predicted
to be high.
46
-0.15
-0.10
-0.05
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Year
Re
tu
rn
Realized Return (TAX)
Predicted Return (-γ*Gtax)
Figure 2: This gure plots the realized January returns on our TAX factor over the course of the
sample. To form TAX, each month we sort all NYSE stocks on our overhang measure and calculate
20th and 80th percentile breakpoints. We then buy all NYSE-AMEX-NASDAQ stocks that are below
the NYSE 20th percentile and sell all NYSE-AMEX-NASDAQ stocks that are above the NYSE 80th
percentile. The positions in the long and short sides are value-weight. In each bin, we plot next to
the realized January return, our forecast of the expected January rebound based on the product of i)
our tax-selling premium variable, , dened in Table II and ii) the net overhang for the TAX factor,
gTAX . That forecast comes from the regression, TAXJAN;t= a0+a1t 1gTAX;t 1+" JAN;t.
The estimate of a0 is 0.00192 (t-statistic of 0.14), the estimate of a1 is -1.99 (t-statistic of -3.52),
and the adjusted R2 is 17.7%.
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Figure 3: This gure graphs various characteristics of selected capital-gains-overhang quintile
portfolios in the days surrounding the turn of the year. For all graphs, the solid line represents the
highest overhang quintile, the dashed line is the middle overhang quintile, and solid dotted line is
the lowest overhang quintile portfolio. On the x axis, 0 represents the last trading day in December
and 1 represents the rst trading day in January. The top two graphs in this gure show daily betas
for these portfolios, where daily beta is a ve-day rolling beta estimate (as explained in Section 3.3).
The left (right) graph plots rolling daily beta conditional on a predicted negative (positive) January
rebound as determined by    g(M). The middle two graphs in this gure show cumulative log
returns for these portfolios. The left (right) graph plots cumulative returns for those time periods
where the markets January rebound is predicted to be below-median (above-median). The bottom
two graphs in this gure show the selling pressure for these portfolios, where selling pressure is the
ratio of sell trades relative to all trades. Therefore, the left (right) panel graphs the average selling
pressure for those time periods where the markets January rebound is predicted to be below-median
(above-median).
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